Famous Hackers and Incidents — 13 Cases Read for the Defender's Lessons (1988–2021)

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka (Muse).
What you get from this page, first: thirteen famous hacker cases from 1988 to 2021 — the Morris Worm, Kevin Mitnick, ILOVEYOU, the Japan Pension Service data breach, WannaCry, and the rest — each set out in the same shape: who was involved, what happened, what came after, and the lesson for the defending side, with sources. The cases are arranged A to Z, so you can open the one whose name you met in the news and walk away knowing why it could not be stopped, and what would have stopped it. This is not a how-to, and it contains no steps for reproducing any attack: it is a dictionary for the defending side.
Security news sometimes carries a very large incident: a worm that spread around the world, a person who got inside a government institution, a pipeline that stopped. Each time, the question is “why could it not be prevented?” — but places where you can read through the outline of an incident together with what happened afterwards are, surprisingly, not so many.
This page is a dictionary that collects well-known hackers and incidents. If you want to start from the meaning of the words, it will read more easily if you look them up first in the Security Glossary: Look Up Any Unfamiliar Warning Word Here First — 52 Terms in Plain Language, with What to Watch For and then come back here.
Index (A to Z)
- A: Albert Gonzalez (2005–2007)
- B: Bangladesh Bank Heist (2016)
- C: Colonial Pipeline Incident (2021)
- G: Gary McKinnon (2001–2002)
- I: ILOVEYOU (2000)
- J: Japan Pension Service Data Breach (2015)
- K: Kevin Mitnick (until 1995)
- L: LulzSec and “Sabu” (2011)
- M: Mirai Botnet (2016) / Morris Worm (1988)
- S: SolarWinds (2020) / Stuxnet (2010)
- W: WannaCry and Marcus Hutchins (2017)
A map of the lessons
Read through all thirteen, and the lessons for the defending side gather into five large groups. (1) A gap in human caution is the entrance (Mitnick’s impersonation calls, ILOVEYOU’s attachment, the Pension Service’s targeted email) — a procedure of not responding on the spot to a request by phone or email, and checking through a different channel, is what works. (2) Managing the keys is the foundation (McKinnon’s undefended machines, Mirai’s factory-default passwords, Colonial’s reused password and dormant account) — change initial passwords, stop reusing them, use two-step verification, and delete accounts you no longer use. (3) Keep applying the fixes (updates) (the Morris Worm, WannaCry) — when a fix comes out, apply it promptly. WannaCry was an incident that came about two months after its fix had come out. (4) Deciding “it is all right now” too early widens the damage (the Pension Service) — do not finish after dealing with one machine; suspect the whole and check it. (5) The party or route you trust itself becomes the entrance (SolarWinds’ legitimate update, the Bangladesh Bank’s legitimate transfer network) — even for legitimate things, a mechanism that watches for anything unusual is needed. At the end of each case, links to the related glossary terms and articles are placed.
A
H-05 Albert Gonzalez — Large-Scale Theft of Card Information (2005–2007)
- Who: A man from Miami, in the United States. It has been reported that there was also a period when, as an informant for the authorities, he cooperated in exposing a bulletin board for card crime.
- What happened: Together with accomplices, he broke into the major retailer TJX (which runs T.J.Maxx and other stores) and the payment processing company Heartland Payment Systems, among others, and stole large numbers of credit card and debit card numbers. In total, he is said to have been involved in the theft and resale of more than 170 million card and ATM numbers, and at the time it was among the largest card frauds in history. At Heartland alone, about 130 million numbers are said to have been stolen.
- Aftermath: He was arrested in 2008, pleaded guilty in three cases, and in March 2010 received a sentence of 20 years in prison. It is recorded that he was released in 2023. The burden on the victim companies has been reported as at least about $171.5 million spent by TJX, and about $130 million spent by Heartland.
- The defender’s lesson: The entrances were the thin protection of a store’s wireless network, and a weakness in the way its database was queried. The more a place “gathers and keeps” card information, the more it is targeted. This is a case that showed the importance of the foundation: do not hold information you can do without holding, and if you do keep it, encrypt it and separate it into compartments.
- Sources: Announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (at the time of sentencing), Computerworld, Network World (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Leak (S-46) / Money Basics — How to Protect Bank Accounts, Cards, and QR Payments
B
H-09 Bangladesh Bank Heist — A Central Bank Was Targeted (2016)
- Who: The U.S. Department of Justice, treating this as the work of a North Korea state-backed group (called the “Lazarus Group” in the private sector), indicted a North Korean programmer, Park Jin Hyok, in 2018. He is in North Korea, and no trial has been realized (the attribution is the claim of the indictment).
- What happened: In February 2016, fraudulent transfer instructions totalling about $1 billion were issued from the account of Bangladesh’s central bank (at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), using SWIFT, the network for transfers between banks. Most were stopped, but about $101 million was actually sent, and of that, $81 million passed through a bank in the Philippines and was laundered through casinos and the like, remaining unrecovered. It has been reported that a spelling mistake in the destination of a transfer instruction became one of the triggers for noticing the fraud. The time targeted was Bangladesh’s weekend (Friday and Saturday are days off), a period when confirmation contacts are delayed.
- Aftermath: The Philippine bank RCBC was given a penalty by its central bank (equivalent to about $52 million). Moves to strengthen the way money flows are confirmed (such as confirmation by phone before a transfer) advanced among banks around the world.
- The defender’s lesson: Fraud happens even inside a legitimate transfer network and legitimate procedures. “For a transfer of a large amount, confirm it through a different channel as well (such as by phone)” and “the time before and after days off is targeted” — lessons that run straight into the countermeasures against transfer fraud in daily life.
- Sources: Press release of the U.S. Department of Justice (2018, announcement of the indictment), document collection of the National Security Archive (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Money Basics — How to Protect Bank Accounts, Cards, and QR Payments / Fraud Basics — “Rushing You and Startling You” Is the Common Sign
C
H-13 Colonial Pipeline Incident — A Dormant Account Was the Entrance (2021)
- Who: The FBI announced this as the work of “DarkSide,” a ransom-demanding criminal group said to be based in Russia. DarkSide was known for the form called “ransomware as a service,” in which the tools are lent out and the proceeds are shared.
- What happened: On May 7, 2021, one of the largest fuel pipelines in the United States stopped completely after receiving a ransom-demanding attack. The pipe, which carries about 45% of the fuel of the U.S. East Coast, stopped, and stockpiling of gasoline and rises in price occurred. The entrance was an account for a VPN (a mechanism for entering a company from outside) that was no longer being used. Its password was a reuse of one that had leaked in a different leak incident, and no two-step confirmation was attached to it. The company paid a ransom of $4.4 million (75 bitcoin), but the recovery tool was slow, and it has been reported that the actual recovery proceeded from its own spares (backups).
- Aftermath: In June 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had recovered 63.7 bitcoin of the ransom that was paid (worth about $2.3 million at the time). DarkSide publicly announced its dissolution after the incident, but it has been reported that the activity of groups regarded as its successors continued. Following this incident, safety standard directives for pipeline operators were issued in the United States.
- The defender’s lesson: (1) Delete accounts you are not using (left in place, they become an entrance by themselves). (2) Stop reusing passwords, and attach two-step confirmation. (3) Paying a ransom does not guarantee that anything comes back, so keep spares (backups) separately. Every one of these runs straight into the tools of daily life.
- Sources: Press release of the U.S. Department of Justice (June 2021, recovery of the ransom), testimony of the company’s CEO at a Senate hearing, reporting by Bloomberg (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Ransomware (S-45) / Security Glossary — Two-step verification (S-29) / Keys in Daily Life — Passwords, Two-Factor Authentication, and Passkeys
G
H-04 Gary McKinnon — Intrusion into the U.S. Military and NASA (2001–2002)
- Who: A systems administrator from Scotland, in the United Kingdom. He acted under the name “Solo,” and according to what he himself has said, he was looking for evidence — said to be hidden — of UFOs and free energy.
- What happened: From February 2001 to March 2002, the U.S. side charged that he broke into 97 computers of the U.S. military and NASA. It is said that damage included the network of the U.S. military’s Washington district (about 2,000 machines) stopping for 24 hours. He himself admits the intrusions. At the time, it has been reported that many machines remained with no password set, or with thin protection, and that this was the background that made the intrusions possible.
- Aftermath: The United States sought his extradition, and there was a court battle of about ten years. In October 2012, the British Home Secretary of the time (Theresa May) stopped the extradition on human rights grounds, for the reason of the risk of suicide due to his Asperger syndrome and depression. Prosecution in the United Kingdom was also dropped, and the case ended.
- The defender’s lesson: This is a case of “the more important a machine is, the more likely a place with no key on it remains.” An inventory that eliminates machines with no password set, and narrowing the range that can be reached from outside, become the foundation.
- Sources: Reporting by the Associated Press (2012), The Register, IEEE Spectrum (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Password (S-31) / Keys in Daily Life — Passwords, Two-Factor Authentication, and Passkeys
I
H-03 ILOVEYOU — Onel de Guzman (2000)
- Who: A person who was a student at a computer vocational school in the Philippines (24 years old at the time). It has been reported that, from a position of being unable to pay the charges for an internet connection, he proposed, as his graduation research, a program to steal other people’s connection passwords, and that the school rejected it.
- What happened: On May 4, 2000, a file attached to an email with the subject “I LOVE YOU” spread around the world. In a form that sent itself on, one after another, to the addresses in the address book of the person who opened it, about one in ten of the computers connected to the internet at the time is said to have been affected, and estimates of the damage range widely, from $5.5 billion to $15 billion. Infection was also confirmed at government institutions in the United States and at the British Parliament, among others.
- Aftermath: In the Philippines at the time, there was no law to crack down on hacking. He was charged under a different law, but the link with the evidence was insufficient, and the charge was dropped. Following this incident, an electronic commerce law was made in the Philippines (July 2000). No prominent activity by him has been reported since.
- The defender’s lesson: Even in an email that arrives from a person you know, treat an attached file as a separate thing. A subject that stirs the feelings, such as a “confession of love,” is still used today. Before opening, taking one breath to ask “is this something that should arrive from this person, in this form?” is the protection at the entrance.
- Sources: Reporting by Computerworld (distributed by the Associated Press), records of the incident (the reporting cited by Wikipedia) (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Worm (S-47) / Virus and Malware Basics — Know the Kinds, and You Can See How to Prevent Them
J
H-08 Japan Pension Service Data Breach — From a Single Targeted Email (2015)
- Who: The attacker has not been identified. The target was the Japan Pension Service, and for readers in Japan this is the major incident closest to home.
- What happened: On May 8, 2015, a member of staff opened a link in a targeted email disguised as a work document, and a terminal was infected. The suspicious communication was found by the monitoring of the state (NISC), and that terminal was cut off, but the Service judged that the matter had “settled for the moment.” After that, more than 100 emails arrived at staff addresses that should not have been public, another member of staff opened an attached file, the infection spread, and between May 21 and 23, personal information including Basic Pension Numbers — about 1.25 million records (for about 1.01 million people) — leaked out.
- Aftermath: It was announced on June 1, 2015. A verification committee established by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare issued a report, and pointed out that although there was a person in charge who suspected a targeted attack in the initial response, the organization as a whole could not move fully, and that it took on trust a report from a contractor saying “the possibility of a leak is extremely low” — and that these widened the damage. The cost of the response, including changing numbers and call centers, came to the scale of 1 billion yen.
- The defender’s lesson: This is the case where the lessons are clearest. (1) Even if you deal with one machine, do not say “it is finished” (do the investigation of the whole first). (2) Raise bad reports upward all the faster (make a form in which the voice of the person who suspected something is not stopped). (3) Do not accept a contractor’s “it is all right” without checking it. Every one of these overlaps with our own rules of “checking is done with different eyes” and “leaving a record.”
- Sources: Verification report of the verification committee and investigation result report of the Japan Pension Service (published materials), special feature by Nikkei XTech (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Targeted attack (S-36) / Virus and Malware Basics — Know the Kinds, and You Can See How to Prevent Them
K
H-02 Kevin Mitnick — A Master of “the Craft of Deceiving People” (until 1995)
- Who: A person called, in the United States, “the most wanted computer criminal” (1963–2023). More than for technology itself, he was known for a method (social engineering) in which, by phone, he impersonated the other party and drew information out of them.
- What happened: From his teens, he repeatedly broke into the systems of telephone companies and major enterprises, and from 1992 he lived as a fugitive for about two and a half years. During that time, the U.S. Department of Justice has announced, he also did such things as copying software from major mobile telephone companies and computer companies. On February 15, 1995, he was arrested by the FBI.
- Aftermath: In a plea bargain in 1999 he was found guilty, and after about five years of imprisonment he was released in 2000. After his release, he himself ran a security consulting company, served as “Chief Hacking Officer” at KnowBe4, a company for safety training for enterprises, and left many books. In 2023, he died of pancreatic cancer at the age of 59.
- The defender’s lesson: The center of his method was not the machine, but “people.” Against a phone call naming an employee, a request that hurries you, and drawing-out that takes advantage of kindness, a procedure is effective: do not answer on the spot; call back, and check with a different person. Just placing a rule that passwords are never asked for by phone narrows the entrance as well.
- Sources: Announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (at the time of the arrest), obituary by the Associated Press (2023), personal record by EBSCO (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Social engineering (S-20) / Fraud Basics — “Rushing You and Startling You” Is the Common Sign
L
H-07 LulzSec and “Sabu” — A Case Where a Companion Was a Cooperator (2011)
- Who: LulzSec was an attacking group that split off from Anonymous, a group that raises political claims. One of its central figures was Hector Monsegur, who named himself “Sabu.”
- What happened: In 2011, it repeatedly broke into enterprises and government institutions and published information. The FBI identified and arrested Sabu in 2011, and he chose to cooperate with the investigation. For about half a year after that, it has been reported, he remained outwardly at the center of the group while passing the movements of his companions to the FBI. From that information, Jeremy Hammond, who had broken into the private intelligence analysis company Stratfor, and others were arrested.
- Aftermath: Hammond received a sentence of ten years in prison in 2013, and was released in 2020. Sabu’s cooperation was valued, and it has been reported that his imprisonment ended at about seven months.
- The defender’s lesson: There are two points to read on the defending side. One is that the cohesion of the attacking side is fragile enough that if “someone” in the group is caught, the whole comes undone. The other comes from the course of events in which the place where Hammond stored the information he stole from the intrusion target was a server prepared by the investigating side: “do not take a story, a tool, or a place that is handed to you on trust” is the same in transactions and consultations on the defending side.
- Sources: Reporting by The Guardian, Computerworld, and Wired (reporter Kevin Poulsen) (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Hackers and the People Who Defend — What Attackers Aim At, and the Work of Security Specialists
M
H-10 Mirai Botnet — A Case Where Home Cameras Were Made into Weapons (2016)
- Who: It was made by three people who were university students in the United States (Paras Jha, Josiah White, and Dalton Norman). It is stated in the court records that the original purpose was to obstruct a competitor in the server business for the game “Minecraft.”
- What happened: Mirai is a program that gets inside cameras, recorders, routers, and the like that are connected to the internet. The way in was only to try a list (about 60 patterns) of the usernames and passwords as they were when shipped from the factory. The several hundred thousand taken-over devices were used for an attack (DDoS) that sends communication all at once, and on October 21, 2016, in an attack on Dyn, a company that holds the role of giving address guidance, many services such as Twitter and Netflix became temporarily unusable in the United States.
- Aftermath: The three pleaded guilty in 2017. It has been reported that, in part because of their cooperation with the investigation, the sentences were not imprisonment but probation and community service, among other things. The design (source code) of Mirai was published, and variants continue to appear even now.
- The defender’s lesson: The biggest entrance was “a device that was bought and left as it was.” Change the initial setting of the password, stop functions you do not use, and apply updates to the device. These three can be started from the router and cameras at home.
- Sources: Announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (at the time of the guilty pleas), records of the incident (the reporting cited by Wikipedia) (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Botnet (S-43) / Security Glossary — DDoS attack (S-24) / Network Basics — Routers and Wi-Fi, Lines and Satellites, and Power for Travel
H-01 Morris Worm — Robert Tappan Morris (1988)
- Who: A graduate student at Cornell University at the time (23 years old). His father was an expert in computer safety who worked around Bell Laboratories and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).
- What happened: On November 2, 1988, a self-replicating program (a worm) that he had made as an experiment to measure the size of the internet spread beyond what he had expected. Of the about 60,000 machines connected to the internet at the time, an estimated 6,000 (about one in ten) stopped working, and universities and NASA were included. It was not made in a way that broke files, but it got into the same machine many times over, and made the machine unusable.
- Aftermath: He became the first person to be tried under the computer crime law of the United States made in 1986 (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). There was no imprisonment; the sentence was three years of probation, 400 hours of community service, and a fine of a little over $10,000. Following this incident, the first emergency response team (CERT) in the United States was born. He later took a doctorate at Harvard University, passed through business, and has become a professor at MIT (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
- The defender’s lesson: Even for an “experiment,” do not put outside a program whose way of spreading you cannot fully verify. On the defending side, fixing known weak points, and deciding in advance the contact point for “who to tell when something happens” (the form of today’s emergency response teams), were born from this incident.
- Sources: FBI, “The Morris Worm” (the official record of the incident), special feature in the Cornell University alumni magazine (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Worm (S-47) / Virus and Malware Basics — Know the Kinds, and You Can See How to Prevent Them
S
H-12 SolarWinds — A Case Where a Legitimate “Update” Became the Entrance (2020)
- Who: The U.S. government officially announced in April 2021 that this was the work of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency (SVR), and also imposed sanctions (Russia denies it). It is positioned not with an individual’s name, but as espionage activity by an agency of a state.
- What happened: The process of assembling the software of SolarWinds, which makes “Orion,” a tool for monitoring networks, was broken into, and a back door was mixed into a legitimate update. Between March and June 2020, the organizations that received that update were about 18,000, and government institutions such as the U.S. Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and major technology companies, were included. It was discovered because FireEye, a security company that was itself a victim, investigated an abnormality of its own; about nine months passed from the intrusion to the discovery.
- Aftermath: The U.S. agency for cyber safety (CISA) issued an emergency directive, and each institution stopped Orion and carried out inspections. The ideas of “protecting the very process of making the tools” and “verifying the safety of the supply source (the supply chain)” became the center of the standard-making that followed.
- The defender’s lesson: Even with a legitimate update, and even if the signature is correct, the contents are not necessarily safe. In an organization, watching for “movements different from usual,” and verifying the protection of the maker of the tools you use, are the lessons. On the side of daily life, the foundation is: do not stop updates — keep applying them — and do not install from anywhere other than the official distribution source.
- Sources: Emergency Directive 21-01 and alert (AA20-352A) of CISA, publication by FireEye (now Mandiant) (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Update (patch) (S-02) / Computer Basics — An Update Is a Repair for a Weak Spot
H-06 Stuxnet — The Worm That Broke Machines (2010)
- Who: The maker has not officially come forward, and multiple news organizations have reported that it is said to have been a joint development by the United States and Israel, but neither country has officially admitted it (the attribution is a matter of “said to be”).
- What happened: A worm found in June 2010. At the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, it targeted the centrifuges for enriching uranium. The facility’s network was cut off from the outside internet, but it is thought to have got in by way of a USB memory stick or the like that was brought in. That about 1,000 centrifuges were broken has been estimated from the movements in the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Another feature was that the monitoring screens kept showing “normal,” so the people on site were late in noticing.
- Aftermath: No specific country or individual was tried. After this incident, the recognition that “the control systems of factories and power plants, too, become targets of cyber attacks” spread around the world, and the making of standards for protecting industrial systems advanced in each country.
- The defender’s lesson: “It is not connected to the internet, so it is safe” is not true. The handling of things brought in, such as USB memory sticks, the separation of control systems from office systems, and watching the movement of the machines themselves (not believing only the numbers on the screen) are the lessons.
- Sources: Research report by Symantec, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” International Cyber Law Toolkit of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Worm (S-47) / Virus and Malware Basics — Know the Kinds, and You Can See How to Prevent Them
W
H-11 WannaCry and Marcus Hutchins — The Worm That Stopped the World, and the Person Who Stopped It (2017)
- Who: WannaCry is a ransom-demanding worm. The United States and the United Kingdom officially announced in December 2017 that it is said to have been the work of North Korea (North Korea denies it). The person who stopped it was Marcus Hutchins, a young British researcher (22 years old at the time, acting under the name “MalwareTech”).
- What happened: On May 12, 2017, a worm that struck a weakness in Windows and spread to the neighboring machine without anyone touching it went out into the world. More than 150 countries and an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 machines were infected, and at the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom, cancellations of medical appointments and operations followed one after another. The fix for this weakness had come out from Microsoft about two months earlier, in March 2017. The center of the damage was organizations that had not applied the fix, and organizations that kept using an old Windows. Hutchins noticed an “address (domain) that no one had taken yet” that was inside the worm, and registered it — whereupon that became the signal to stop, and the spreading stopped.
- Aftermath: Hutchins was called a hero, but in August of that year he was arrested in the United States. It was a different charge: that in his teens he had made and sold a tool (Kronos) to steal bank information. In 2019 he pleaded guilty, and the sentence was treated as “time already served” with one year of supervised release; there was no imprisonment. It has been reported that the judge valued, in the sentencing, that he himself had turned to the defending side.
- The defender’s lesson: (1) For a fix, “when it comes out, apply it promptly.” Leaving it for about two months became damage on a world scale. (2) The past offense of the person who stopped it does not disappear, but the path of “turning and standing on the defending side” appeared in the sentencing as well. The direction in which technology is used divides how a person is valued.
- Sources: Security information of Microsoft (MS17-010), TechCrunch, Threatpost, Associated Press (checked 2026-11-21)
- Related reading: Security Glossary — Ransomware (S-45) / Security Glossary — Worm (S-47) / Virus and Malware Basics — Know the Kinds, and You Can See How to Prevent Them
In closing — Incidents become a checklist for protection
None of the thirteen incidents is a distant story caused by “someone special.” What became the entrance was an attached file that someone opened, an initial password that had not been changed, an account left in place, a fix that had not been applied, a report of “it is all right” that was not checked. Every one of them runs straight into how the tools of daily life are handled.
There is no fixed order for reading. Open the incident that catches your interest, and move from the “Related reading” at its end to the glossary and the basics articles — that is how this dictionary is used. The meanings of the words are placed in the Security Glossary, and the main body of the mechanisms in each of the basics articles. This dictionary is the place for “what actually happened,” which connects the space between them.
Entrance (other languages)