Government Information Leaked Through a Shared Tool — Fujitsu's ProjectWEB Case (2021)

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.
This time, I am looking back at an incident from a little while ago. What was targeted was not a system inside a single company. It was a “shared tool” used together by many companies and government offices. When that opens, the damage spreads all at once.
The result first
The conclusion, up front:
- In May 2021, there was unauthorised access to ProjectWEB, the project information-sharing tool operated by Fujitsu, and part of the materials stored there was stolen. The damage Fujitsu compiled on August 11 of the same year covered 129 companies and institutions
- What was stolen included information about equipment for work systems, project organisation charts, meeting notes, work lists and progress tables, and some of it contained personal information such as names and email addresses
- For the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism alone, it is known from the ministry’s announcement that at least about 76,000 email addresses of staff and related people were included
- The way in was to use legitimate IDs and passwords, entering through normal authentication and normal communication. Fujitsu explained that it was highly likely some weakness had been exploited. When someone enters with the right key, even the records do not easily look suspicious
- The verification committee later pointed out, as causes, that the system for protecting information was insufficient, that strengthening the defences had not kept up because of limits on people and budgets, and that no system was in place to notice quickly
What happened — a shared ledger was opened
ProjectWEB is a tool for sharing information between people inside and outside a company on work such as system development. It allowed progress and materials to be viewed together over the internet, and it ran in Fujitsu’s data centre.
To put it in terms of a house, it was like a shared warehouse used by everyone in the neighbourhood. Many people held keys, and inside were important documents from each household. On May 6, 2021, Fujitsu noticed signs that someone had entered that warehouse without permission.
On May 20, Narita International Airport Corporation announced the possibility of damage, and on May 25 Fujitsu announced the unauthorised access and stopped use of the tool. The next day, May 26, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism announced that information about equipment and at least about 76,000 email addresses had leaked. Announcements of damage followed, one after another, from the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and others.
When someone enters with the right key, it is hard to notice
What makes one think in this incident is the way in.
According to Fujitsu’s explanation, the third party used legitimate IDs and passwords, and entered from outside through normal authentication and normal communication. In other words, they did not break the key and enter; they entered in the form of a person holding the right key.
When that happens, there is no easy sign that “a stranger has come in.” Even looking at the records (logs), it is hard to distinguish from normal use. That is exactly why it matters not to rely only on IDs and passwords, to add one more check on top, and to have a mechanism that notices a way of entering that differs from usual. The verification committee also listed, as one of the causes, that no system was in place to find unauthorised access immediately.
There is another important point the verification committee raised. This tool had come to be used, in a gradual, unplanned way, for a wider range of situations and purposes than originally intended. As materials were placed there because it was convenient, and as the number of users grew, “what is placed here” and “who can enter” gradually became something no one could see as a whole.
The damage spread beyond a single company
Another feature of this incident is that the damage did not end inside Fujitsu. The government offices and companies that had used the same tool each had to make announcements under their own names. Some institutions, like the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, explained with figures for the number of email addresses; others announced that study materials had leaked. A single event on the side providing the tool became, for each side using it, “its own incident.”
This also holds a lesson for the side that entrusts. When you borrow a convenient tool, picture in advance what of yours would come out on the day that tool is opened. Keep, on the borrowing side too and in your own hands, a list of the materials you entrusted and a contact point for receiving word. It is not over once you have entrusted it; choosing a tool includes how it will be watched over while it is entrusted, I think.
The reasons the response was delayed were also left in the record
The verification committee also pointed out frankly the reasons why the response after discovery was delayed.
It had begun by responding on the premise that this was “an event in a single project.” Because operations depended on individuals, with ways of doing things differing by person in charge, and because management of records was insufficient, it took time to grasp the structure of the tool as a whole. And there was little shared understanding, among the departments involved, of what kind of thing this tool was.
This is not only a story about large companies. Even in a small company, the state of “what is in that shared folder can only be known by asking that person” is common. In ordinary times it may still turn, but on the day something happens, the response is delayed by exactly that much. Keeping things in a form where anyone can see the whole is itself a solid form of protection.
Fujitsu afterwards, accepting the recommendations of a verification committee of outside experts, set out as pillars for preventing recurrence: strengthening the protection of its internal systems as a whole, putting in place an organisation that finds irregularities quickly and responds, and managing internal systems in a unified way.
For people running a small company — how to protect shared tools
This incident looks like a story about government offices and large companies. But the form of using shared tools is the same in small companies and in individual work.
- Decide what to place in shared places. For folders and tools used together with business partners, decide in advance the line between materials that may be placed and materials that will not be placed. Not leaving materials from finished work sitting there is part of that
- Review, from time to time, who can enter. Check whether the keys of people whose work has ended, or of companies whose relationship has ended, remain, and whether the record of key lending is in a form no one can see
- Add one more check. Against a method that enters with the correct password, a password alone is not enough. Choosing tools that have one more check (multi-factor authentication) from the start becomes the foundation
- Keep a ledger where the whole can be seen. Which tools, who can enter them, and what is placed there. Removing the state where only the person in charge knows leads to speed on the day something happens
- Do not put protection behind convenience. The verification committee also listed, as a true cause, that because of an awareness oriented to convenience and lowering costs, information management and protection were at times not given priority. Busy times are exactly when this order must not be mistaken
To close
The heart of the ProjectWEB case is not the story that “a large company was targeted.” A shared tool used by everyone is convenient, and for that very reason, when one place opens, the damage spreads, and when someone enters with the right key, it is hard to notice. That is the record.
Is there a similar shared place in your own workplace? Review, once, what is placed there and who can enter. That small check is, I think, the most practical lesson that can be brought home from this incident.
Sources: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, “Leak of MLIT-related information due to unauthorised access to the project information-sharing tool managed and operated by Fujitsu Limited” (May 26, 2021). Fujitsu, “Matters pointed out by the verification committee” (April 22, 2022). The contents of Fujitsu’s announcement of its investigation results on August 11, 2021 were cross-checked against reporting by Nikkei XTech and others.
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