A Hospital's Information Was Entered from Outside — Unauthorized Access to Tokushima University Hospital, and How to Protect the Information of Patients and Staff

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.
This time, the story is about a hospital’s information. A university hospital’s systems were entered from outside, and concerns arose that the information of patients and staff — 18,920 people in total — might have been exposed. A hospital’s information is information deeply tied to people’s lives: the very fact of having received a test is part of it. The place where that information gathers was targeted through an outside door.
The result first
Here is the conclusion, up front.
- On December 25, 2025, Tokushima University Hospital announced that systems it manages had been accessed without authorization from outside, and that there were concerns the personal information of 18,920 patients and staff in total might have been exposed
- Two arrangements were involved. The 16,945 patients and 42 staff registered in the specimen testing arrangement (blood, urine, and so on), and the 1,933 staff registered in the nursing career support system, which nurses use for training and the like
- Test results (test values) were not included. Neither were credit card or financial information. On the other hand, the nursing career support system side did include staff passwords
- As a result of an investigation by an external specialist organization, the hospital announced that, at present, no clear trace has been confirmed of information having leaked outside or been misused. This is not a story of a confirmed leak
- The prevention measures the hospital named are: strengthening its security monitoring arrangements, introducing multi-factor authentication, and moving some systems to a form usable only from the hospital’s internal network. These three are ways of protecting that apply as they are to ordinary workplaces, not only hospitals
What happened — what the announcement confirmed
What can be confirmed from Tokushima University Hospital’s notice, “On the Possibility of a Personal Information Leak,” is the following.
- The period during which the unauthorized access is said to have occurred is October 11 to October 22, 2025
- The day the hospital grasped the matter (the day of recognition) was October 29, 2025
- In response, the hospital cut off the servers that had been the target of the unauthorized access, changed passwords, and reconfigured the network. An investigation by an external specialist organization was also carried out
- The personal information of patients and staff registered in the work systems — 18,920 people in total — came under concern of exposure. The information involved includes names and identification IDs, and other information that can identify individuals
- However, no clear trace of information having leaked outside or been misused has been confirmed at present
- Notification of those affected is being carried out in sequence, by email and by post. The hospital is consulting the Tokushima prefectural police (according to the hospital’s FAQ)
The wording of the announcement matters here, too. “Concern of exposure,” “possibility.” It is not written that a leak has been confirmed. There are traces of entry. But no clear trace has been found of information having been taken outside or misused. This article keeps that same line.
The entrance — what was reported as the hospital’s explanation
The hospital’s notice document itself does not record the details of the route — from where the entry was made. However, as the hospital’s explanation, the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun conveyed the outline of the route. As the range of reporting, it is set apart here.
- On the morning of October 23, a staff member checking the systems found traces that, in a short span the previous night, well over a hundred unauthorized logins had been repeated. The hospital cut off the network connected to the servers holding important information such as electronic medical records
- An investigation by an external specialist organization found that there had been unauthorized access from an IP address in Hong Kong since October 11
- The entrance is said to have been a route passing through the nurses’ home training arrangement (the nursing career support system), with traces of an attempt to enter the server that makes the labels pasted on blood collection tubes and the like
- In some of the hospital’s internal systems, a suspicious program that communicates outward had been planted
- There were also traces of more than 100 login attempts against the hospital’s internal information systems, including the electronic medical records
What deserves attention here is the nature of the arrangement said to have become the entrance. An arrangement used for training at home is, by design, made on the premise that one “enters from outside.” A door that can be entered from outside the home is convenient — but if its lock is weak, it is a door for anyone outside, too. The story of repeated login attempts is also the story of that door’s lock being tried, again and again.
To repeat: these route details are not written in the hospital’s notice document; they are the range that reporting conveyed as the hospital’s explanation. The cause published in the document goes only as far as “unauthorized access from outside.”
The information that was involved, and the information that was not
The targets divide into two arrangements.
The specimen testing arrangement (blood, urine, and so on)
- Information about patients (16,945 cases): for those who received specimen testing (blood, urine, and so on) at the hospital between July 25 and October 22, 2025 — patient ID, name (kanji and kana), sex, date of birth, and test order information (specimen name, request comments, and the like)
- Information about staff (42 people, including retirees): for the staff who handled work using this arrangement in the same period — staff ID and name
- Test results (test values) were not included
The nursing career support system
- For the registered staff (1,933 people, including retirees): user ID, password, name, staff number, department, job type, position, email address, and the like, together with training history, teaching materials, ladder information, and the like
Together, 18,920 people. What was not included should also be written clearly. There are no test values. There is no credit card or financial information, either.
On the other hand, there are two points that cannot be taken lightly. One is that passwords were included on the nursing career support system side. The hospital, in its FAQ, asks people to reset their passwords as needed. If the same password was also being reused in other arrangements, it becomes material for trying the keys of those other arrangements as well. The other is about the patients’ information. The test items and values were not included, but the very fact that “during that period, at that hospital, I had blood or urine tested” is information from deep within a person’s life. In a later correction to its FAQ, the hospital indicated that the fact of having visited a medical institution, and the patient information handled there, may amount to “personal information requiring special care.”
The hospital’s response, and the roughly two months until the announcement
The hospital’s response and its course from here are as follows.
- Response at discovery: cutting off the target servers, changing passwords, reconfiguring the network. Investigation by an external specialist organization. Consultation with the Tokushima prefectural police
- Prevention: strengthening the security monitoring arrangements, and moving forward with the introduction of multi-factor authentication. Some systems are to be moved to closed operation, accessible only from the hospital’s internal network
- Notification of those affected: identification of the targets is complete, and notification is proceeding in sequence by email and by post. The notice document is dated December 22, and informing those affected had been proceeding ahead of the announcement
The hospital also explains, in its FAQ, why the announcement took roughly two months. In order to identify the scope of the impact accurately, it worked with an external specialist organization to examine access records and communication histories closely, and it took time to identify the affected patients and staff without error. And, so that those affected could be informed individually at the same time as the announcement, it prepared the post and email arrangements. The explanation is that it “prioritized accuracy and safety,” and it says it will work toward providing information more promptly in the future.
There are two entrances — entered from outside / carried out from inside
The entrances through which a hospital’s information is put at risk are not only the “entered from outside” form of this case. There is another: the “carried out from inside” form. Information is copied onto a small, portable tool — such as a USB memory stick holding records — and taken outside, or the tool itself is lost. Even with the same hospital information, the door is in the opposite place.
The tools for guarding these two are different. The guard against the entered-from-outside form is to layer the door’s locks (multi-factor authentication), to close arrangements that do not need to be entered from outside to the inside of the hospital only, and to watch for traces of attempted entry. The guard against the carried-out-from-inside form is to decide and manage the tools and occasions on which things may be carried out, to keep records of copying, and to narrow the information carried itself. With only one of the two, the other door stays open. Reading this case as a story of the “outside door” side is, I think, the accurate reading.
How to protect — in a form that applies to ordinary workplaces too
Finally, the lessons for the protecting side. The prevention measures the hospital named are, as they are, a model of how ordinary workplaces can protect themselves.
For those who hold information (hospitals, companies, shops)
- Layer the keys of arrangements that can be entered from outside: the more an arrangement is entered from home or outside, the less it should rely on a password alone. Introduce multi-factor authentication — an arrangement that confirms with another material in addition to the password, such as a number delivered to a smartphone. The form said to have occurred here, with well over a hundred login attempts, is the sight of a door with a single key being targeted
- Close what does not need to be entered from outside to the inside only: make arrangements used only within the hospital usable only from the hospital’s internal network. By closing them to the inside of the workplace, the number of outside doors itself goes down by one
- Keep records, and place a watch that notices abnormalities: here, the chance to notice the abnormality was the login traces found in a staff member’s check. Keeping records (logs) and confirming them within a settled watch becomes the power to stop things early
- Cut password reuse on the organization’s side, too: so that even if one arrangement’s password leaks, it does not spread to other arrangements. Decide in advance on different passwords for each arrangement, and on the steps for changing them when a leak occurs
- When you notice something wrong, first stop it, and cut the connection: in this case, at the stage where the traces were found, the network connected to the important servers was cut off. Even if it is inconvenient, stop first. That judgment holds down the spread of the impact
For those who entrust information (patients and users)
- Confirm communications naming a hospital or company at the official contact point: “requests for confirmation” and suspicious charges that arrive after an incident are easily turned into material for impersonation. The hospital asks people to contact the hospital if they receive a suspicious communication or charge. Do not use the contact written in the message; confirm it yourself, at the contact point in the official notice
- Change the arrangements where you use the same password: not limited to this case — when you hear that a password may have leaked, replace the keys of other arrangements where you use the same password. In arrangements where two-step verification can be introduced, introduce it
- Do not answer charges you do not recognize: the more worried you are, the more talk of charges and procedures arrives. For anything you do not recognize, do not answer on the spot; report it to the contact point
The lines — what is not known
The bigger the uproar, the more the lines matter. As of this article, here is an honest list of what is not known.
- The details of the intrusion route are not written in the hospital’s notice document: the route talk in this article is the range that the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun conveyed as the hospital’s explanation. The cause published in the document goes only as far as “unauthorized access from outside”
- Whether a leak occurred is not settled: “no clear trace has been confirmed of information having leaked outside or been misused” is the investigation’s conclusion. The absence of traces of removal and the complete denial of the possibility are not the same thing. The hospital, too, says it “cannot completely deny the possibility”
- No secondary damage has been confirmed at present: if new announcements come out, the content will change. The hospital says it will announce investigation results and additional information on its official website as they come
- This article is based on the announcements and reporting readable as of November 21, 2026
A hospital’s information is not only about illness and tests. It is the very footprints of a life: “when, at which hospital, and for what business I was involved.” The more conveniently the doors that can be entered from outside are used, the more the responsibility for those doors’ locks and watch shifts. This incident, I think, showed that obvious thing again, from the side of a large hospital.
Sources
- Tokushima University Hospital, “On the Possibility of a Personal Information Leak” (announced December 25, 2025; the notice document is dated December 22) https://www.tokushima-hosp.jp/news/info.html?news_id=1093
- Tokushima University Hospital, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) (for patients)” https://www.tokushima-hosp.jp/pdf/news1093-01_ver0115.pdf
- Tokushima University Hospital, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)” https://www.tokushima-hosp.jp/pdf/news1093-03_ver1225.pdf
- Asahi Shimbun, “Unauthorized access at Tokushima University Hospital; possible leak of information of some 19,000 patients and others” (December 25, 2025)
- Yomiuri Shimbun, “Unauthorized access to Tokushima University Hospital; personal information of some 19,000 patients and nurses may have leaked” (December 25, 2025)
- Cybersecurity-jp.com, “Possibility of personal information leak of up to some 18,000 people due to unauthorized access | Tokushima University Hospital” (January 6, 2026) https://cybersecurity-jp.com/news/111913
- The meanings of words can be looked up in the Security Lab glossary: Security Glossary — Personal Information (S-09) / Leak (S-46) / Multi-Factor Authentication (S-21) / Two-Step Verification (S-29) / Impersonation (S-28)
Entrance (other languages)