Devices & Accounts

The Keys of the Members Who Send Flowers Were Targeted — Unauthorized Access to Hana Cupid, and How to Stop Reusing Passwords

Security Lab — kurashiki-bouzu

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.

This time, the story is about the arrangement for sending flowers. Flowers for celebrations, for get-well wishes, and flower offerings at funerals. Hana Cupid is an arrangement in which florists across Japan are connected to deliver flowers, and it is often used for ordering funeral flower offerings as well. The information of its members was targeted from the outside.

The result first

First, the conclusion.

What happened — what the announcement confirmed

Hana Cupid Co., Ltd. issued its “Apology and Notice Regarding the Exposure of Member Information Due to Unauthorized Access to Our Websites (Internet Hana Cupid and others)” on October 28, 2026. The course of events that can be confirmed from the announcement is as follows.

To compare this number of 4,238,242 with Japan’s population (about 124 million), it comes to roughly one in every 29 people. It is a scale at which the “key sets” of a great many people, who registered in order to send flowers, went outside.

The company’s response is also written in the announcement. It shut off all the attack routes used for the unauthorized access, and strengthened the network’s access control and monitoring systems. At this point, no new suspicious behavior has been confirmed. It is working with outside specialist organizations to find the cause. It reported to the Personal Information Protection Commission and to the police (the cybercrime consultation desk). To the members in scope, it has been sending contacts in turn, since October 28, to their registered email addresses (because the number of people is large, completing this is expected to take a certain amount of time).

And, at this point, no secondary use or unauthorized use of information from this case has been confirmed.

The password was a “hash value” — the wording of the announcement

Here, let me look carefully at the wording of the announcement. How this incident should be taken changes here.

About the exposed passwords, the announcement writes “in the form of hash values that cannot be used as they are.” A hash value is not the password itself, but a record whose shape has been changed by calculation. A service normally keeps not the password itself but this shape-changed record, and at login, it puts the word that came in through the same calculation and checks whether it matches. From the shape-changed record, the original word cannot simply be read back (the mechanism of passwords can also be looked up in the glossary).

The announcement also says that the passwords were “stored in a form that cannot be restored or deciphered as it is (an irreversible conversion),” and the company’s judgment is that the possibility of accounts being misused by a third party immediately is low.

In the first announcement, the expression “encrypted” was used for this, but on October 30, 2026, the company corrected this expression to “hash values.” The news reports that spoke of “encrypted passwords” were based on the expression before this correction. Even if what is meant is the same, the fact that the words were corrected to be accurate is worth recording.

However, “the possibility of immediate misuse is low” and “there is nothing to do” are different things. As the glossary also notes, when a shape-changed record goes outside, short words and easy-to-guess words can sometimes be found out by trying calculations. The company itself recommends changing passwords, to be thorough. This announcement should be read not as material for relaxing, but as material for calmly taking action. That is the line it draws.

What was not exposed, and who is not in scope

Just as important is the line around what was not exposed. The announcement and the reporting agree on the following points.

This is not an incident in which the information of the people who received the flowers (the delivery destinations) was exposed. What was exposed is only the information of the members on the “sending” side. This distinction connects to the reassurance of the “receiving” side, which I write about later.

Why the “set” is dangerous — the password-reuse story

Then, why can we not relax even though names and addresses were not exposed? The core is that what leaked was a “set.”

Login ID, password, email address. When these three come together, the side doing the targeting can try the same combination, one after another, at the doors of other services. This is called a credential stuffing attack. Many people do not change the key from service to service, and reuse the same ID and password. A “set” leaked from one place becomes a candidate door for as many places as it is reused at.

This time, the passwords leaked in the form of hash values. They cannot be used as they are. Even so, short words, and easy-to-guess words based on birthdays or favorite words, can be traced back to the original word by trying calculations. A “set” that has been traced back is then tried, just as it is, at the places where it is reused.

This point is written clearly in the “frequently asked questions” of the company’s announcement as well: if you reuse the same login ID and password at other services, it recommends changing the passwords on those services too, in order to prevent secondary damage. That the core of this case’s defense lies here is the same view on the announcement’s side.

Those who send flower offerings, and those who receive them — from the field’s perspective

From here, this is my view as a former funeral director. I am not writing about the cause of the incident. The route of intrusion has not been made public, and no conclusions can be drawn. I write about the information around the act of “sending flowers,” from the side that knows the field.

A flower offering is something that delivers one’s feelings for the deceased in the form of flowers. Those who send them are people who were close to the deceased, and people from workplaces and business partners. The delivery destinations are funeral venues and the homes of the bereaved families. An arrangement of florists connected across the country, like Hana Cupid, can deliver flower offerings even from far away, so it is often used in funeral settings as well.

In this incident, the positions of the sending side and the receiving side are clearly divided.

For the receiving side, this line matters. This time, the worry that “information may have been leaked” did not pile onto a house in the midst of grief.

On the other hand, for the sending side, there is a point to be careful about: the overlap of timing. Right after sending a flower offering, or before and after a funeral, contacts pretending to be about the order — “confirmation of your order,” “a notice about delivery” — can look genuine in that period. The company also calls attention to the possibility that phishing email with a realistic face may arrive at the exposed email addresses.

This autumn, there were also the Tamanoya case, in which the order information for flower offerings and gifts was targeted, and the case of the funeral hall reservation system in Ashikaga City. The arrangements around funerals have been targeted one after another. The kinds of information that leaked differ in each, but I think they overlap on one point: the information that gathers around the procedures of parting is information with a great deal of material for the side doing the targeting.

How to protect yourself — what you can do today

Finally, I write how readers can protect themselves. Whether you may be in scope or not, reviewing reuse is common to everyone.

The lines — what is not known

The bigger the story, the more the lines matter. As of this article, I honestly list what is not known.

Sending flowers is a warm arrangement within our lives, delivering feelings at someone’s milestone. In this incident, in which the “key sets” of that arrangement were targeted, the core of the defense is very clear. Stop reusing. Do not respond to pretended contacts. These two are ways of protecting yourself that work from today, whether or not you have ever used Hana Cupid.

Sources


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