The Flower-Offering Order Information Was Targeted — Unauthorized Access to the Official Website of Funeral Company Tamanoya, and the Protection of Sending the Payment Outside

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.
This time, the story is about the “orders for flower offerings and gifts” arrangement on a funeral company’s official website being targeted. It is a separate incident from the Ashikaga City funeral hall reservation system case, and I will write about this one on its own.
The result first
Here is the conclusion, up front.
- On the official website of Tamanoya Co., Ltd. (a funeral company running funeral halls in Fukushima and Ibaraki), unauthorized access to the flower-offering and gift order system was confirmed; a first report was issued on October 20, 2026, and a follow-up report with the investigation results on November 11
- What may have been exposed is 10,401 orders and 833 web form users. However, the investigation confirmed no trace of information having been taken out. On the other hand, there was a period during which the database was in a state where it could be read, so the matter is being handled as a “possible exposure,” and those affected are being contacted individually
- The cause, it was announced, was the exploitation of a vulnerability in the website system used on the official website. That the cause has been announced is one of the differences from the Ashikaga City case
- Credit card information is not included among what may have been exposed. This is because the payment part was arranged to move to an external service, and the company never held card information in the first place. It became a real example of a way of protecting: “information you do not hold cannot be leaked”
- At Kigetsudo Sereo (Yamanashi Prefecture), which uses the same arrangement, the same thing happened, with 36 cases. The same arrangement also carries the same weakness
What happened — what the announcements confirmed
First, the first report. On October 20, 2026, Tamanoya Co., Ltd. and its parent company, Cocolonet Co., Ltd., announced the following.
- On September 10, 2026, unauthorized access by a third party to the flower-offering and gift order system on the official website was confirmed
- Emergency responses were carried out immediately, including deleting the unauthorized account and blocking the IP address the attack came from, and access has been monitored continuously since then
- At that point, no trace had been confirmed of personal information being output or taken outside
- What might have been exposed was the name, address, telephone number, email address and order details of customers who ordered flower offerings and gifts through the official website — about 10,400 cases
- A report was made to the Personal Information Protection Commission, and the police were consulted. Customers whose information might have been exposed are being contacted individually, in sequence
- A full investigation by outside specialists is under way, with completion expected around the end of October 2026
Next, the follow-up report with the investigation results. It was announced on November 11, 2026.
- The forensic investigation by an outside investigation company has been completed. Within the scope of the records that could be confirmed, no fact was confirmed of data containing personal information having been sent or taken outside
- However, there was a period during which an attacker had entered the system and the contents of the database were in a state where they could be read, so the possibility that a third party viewed or obtained personal data cannot be completely denied
- For that reason, the matter is being handled as one in which data containing personal information may have flowed out, and those affected are being contacted individually, in sequence
- Those affected were determined by a close examination of the data: 10,401 customers who ordered flower offerings and gifts (name, address, telephone number, email address, order details), and 833 users of the web forms (inquiries, document requests, consultation reservations) (name, address, telephone number, email address, gender, inquiry contents)
- The cause was determined to be the exploitation of a vulnerability in the website system used on the official website
- At present, no fact has been confirmed of personal information having flowed out, and no fact has been confirmed of damage such as misuse arising from this incident
- As measures to prevent recurrence, an update of the system itself and strict access restrictions on the administration screen were implemented. Going forward, in addition to continuous monitoring, the maintenance and operations structure will be reviewed
Here too, the wording of the announcement matters. “No fact was confirmed of data having been taken out” and “there was a period during which the database was in a state where it could be read” — both are written. The first is material for relief; the second is a reason not to let one’s guard down. The company placed both side by side and, on that basis, is treating the matter as a “possible outflow” and proceeding with contacting those affected. It is not written that an exposure has been confirmed.
The same thing happened at Kigetsudo Sereo
At Kigetsudo Sereo Co., Ltd. (a funeral company running funeral halls in Yamanashi Prefecture), in the same group, the same thing had happened.
- On September 11, 2026, the day after Tamanoya, unauthorized access to the flower-offering and gift order system on the official website was confirmed
- In the follow-up report (November 11, 2026), those affected were determined to be 36 customers who ordered flower offerings and gifts (name, address, telephone number, email address, order details). At the first-report stage, about 30 cases had been reported
- The lines drawn by the investigation results (no fact confirmed of data having been taken out / there was a period during which the database could be read), the cause (a vulnerability in the website system), and the measures to prevent recurrence are the same in content as Tamanoya’s
The size of the number of cases is not the essence. The official websites of two companies were entered in the same way, through the same weakness of the same arrangement. Aligning arrangements is efficient for running the work, but the weaknesses align too. I think this point is a quiet lesson.
Why was the card information not included?
In this announcement, this is the part worth remembering as a reader.
The announcement says this: “Regarding the credit card information at the time of ordering, it is in a form where it is entered after moving to an external service, and our company does not acquire or hold credit card information in the first place.”
In other words, orders were received on the company’s own website, and only the payment part was sent out to a specialist external service. Card numbers were entered on the external service’s side, and were not placed in the company’s own database.
Even if the database came to be in a state where it could be read, information that is not there cannot be read. In the way of protecting called “narrowing down the information you hold,” besides the form of reducing the items collected, there is the form of “not holding, from the start, what you do not need to hold.” Sending the payment outside became a real example of that.
Of course, this does not protect everything. Order information and form information remain with the company itself. Even so, as a line for making the scope smaller when something does leak, “sending the payment outside” is, I think, a form that even small operators can adopt easily.
Why are order arrangements around funerals targeted? — from the field
From here, this is my view as a former funeral director. The cause this time has been announced as a vulnerability, so here I will not write about the cause, but about “what kind of information flower-offering and gift order information is,” from the side that knows the field.
Flower offerings and gifts are orders for sending flowers and offerings to the place of a funeral. In general, what gathers with each order is information like this.
- The name, address, telephone number and email address of the sending side (the sender)
- The funeral hall the offerings are delivered to, the schedule of the funeral, and the name of the deceased (the part corresponding to what the announcement calls “order details”)
I note that in Tamanoya’s announcement, the affected item is written only as “order details,” and the detailed breakdown of its contents has not been made public. What I write here is about the arrangement of flower-offering and gift orders in general.
What order information shows is “who has died, when the funeral will be held, and who sent flowers.” The deceased, the chief mourner, and the sending side — their connections come together within a single order. Information about connections has many materials for the side that would misuse it. That is because contacts disguised as procedures or condolence visits can be made to look plausible.
One more thing: among the 833 web form cases, “inquiry contents” are included. In forms for document requests and consultation reservations, the family’s circumstances, and the very contents of the consultation, are sometimes written. Order information and consultation information gather in the same place, but their weight differs.
Ashikaga City’s reservation information and this order information differ both in where they gather and in their contents. Even so, the point that “around funerals, people’s lives and feelings gather” is common to both.
The fear beyond “possible” — in the person’s own voice
This section places the view of Kurashiki Bouzu himself, in his own words as they are. It is about why one cannot be fully relieved by the announcement’s words, “no trace was confirmed of data having been taken out,” and how he himself sees it. Beyond where information is stolen, there are places of buying and selling that cannot be seen from the surface, such as the dark web.
“The frightening thing about unauthorized access is that stolen information is bought and sold on dark websites and the like. I think it is that, in places you know nothing about, accounts are opened and certificates are created, and another version of yourself comes to exist.”
About being bought and sold, he has also left these short words.
“Personal information sells even when it is duplicated.”
Even when the same information circulates again and again and overlaps with information from other incidents, buyers are found. That is why information that has once gone outside does not disappear with the passing of time.
Why does the stealing side not come out into the open? About that calculation, too, he went on to say this.
“There is no way the person who stole it would brazenly come out into the open. Even if they sell one person’s information for just a few hundred yen, when it is the information of tens of thousands of people, a large amount of money ends up in their pocket. And once they get a taste for it, they will keep repeating the same thing to keep earning.”
Information that looks small for one person changes into a large amount of money when gathered in units of tens of thousands, and once they get a taste for it, it is repeated. The reason incidents are repeated lies in that calculation.
To close this view, he said this.
“It means that name lists sell — now, just as they always have.”
It is the reading that, though the form has changed from the days when name lists were bought and sold, the contents are the same. I think that the way of proceeding — announcing at the “possible” stage and contacting each affected person — has the meaning of letting people notice early whether their own information has become material for creating “another version of themselves.”
How to protect order information — for those who hold it, and those who entrust it
Finally, I will write the lessons for the protecting side, divided into those who hold the information and those who entrust it.
For those who hold it (funeral companies and operators)
- Do not hold information you do not need to hold: This time, the reason card information was not included is that the payment had been sent out to an external service. In order and consultation forms as well, narrow the items down to what the work needs. Information that was not collected cannot be leaked
- Put updates of the foundation into “the usual work”: The cause this time was announced as a vulnerability in the website arrangement. The “update of the system itself” and “strict access restrictions on the administration screen” announced as measures to prevent recurrence become, as they are, checkpoints for other operators too. I have written a separate article about how to carry out the checking that finds the weak spots yourself, before someone breaks in: You Can Find the ‘Weak Spots’ Yourself, Before Someone Breaks In — The Basics of Vulnerability Assessment and How to Protect a Small Site
- Monitoring and records that can notice a “readable state”: The investigation could say “no trace was confirmed of data having been taken out” because records remained. Arrangements for checking whether there are signs of having been looked into are not something you finish by installing them — they are something you keep turning
- Announce at the “possible” stage, and contact people individually: The way of proceeding — informing people not after things are confirmed, but at the stage where the database was in a readable state — creates time for the side that entrusts its information to protect it themselves
For those who entrust it (users and families)
- Individual contact from the company is being made in sequence: Those affected are to be contacted individually by Tamanoya, or by Kigetsudo Sereo. If this applies to you, please check that contact
- Do not respond on the spot to suspicious contacts: The announcement also calls for care: if suspicious email, SMS, telephone calls or postal items arrive, do not open them or respond to them, and do not open the links or attached files in them, or enter passwords, authentication codes or card information. Contacts wearing the face of “for confirmation” that arrive after an incident are sometimes impersonation
- When verifying, use the announced contact point: For inquiries, contact them yourself through the announced contact point (Cocolonet’s inquiry form, weekdays 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and verify
- Keep the information you write in forms to what is needed: Even in a consultation form, you can choose not to write circumstances that do not need to be written. The scope of the information handed over becomes, as it is, the scope of the impact
Where the line is — what is not yet known
The bigger the stir, the more the line matters. As of this article, I will honestly list what is not yet known.
- Exposure has not been confirmed: In the investigation, no trace was confirmed of data having been taken out. This is at the “possible” stage
- The details of the vulnerability have not been made public: Which arrangement, and what kind of weakness it was, is not written anywhere in the announcements. I will not jump to conclusions about the details
- The length of the period during which the database could be read has not been made public: From when to when it was in a state where it could be read is not written in the announcements
- No secondary damage has been confirmed: This is as of the follow-up report of November 11, 2026
- This article is based on announcements and reporting that could be read as of November 21, 2026. If new announcements come out, the contents will change
The information that gathers around funerals is not only the deceased’s own. It is also information about the lives of the side that sends flowers and the side that consults. That the decision “not to hold” can become protection, and that people are honestly informed at the “possible” stage — I think this incident quietly showed those two things.
Sources
- Tamanoya Co., Ltd., “Report and Apology Regarding the Possibility of Personal Information Outflow Due to Unauthorized Access” (October 20, 2026) https://tamanoya.cocolonet.jp/news/
- Tamanoya Co., Ltd., “Apology and Notice Regarding the Occurrence of Unauthorized Access and the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure (Follow-up Report)” (November 11, 2026) https://tamanoya.cocolonet.jp/news/20261111_16/
- Cocolonet Co., Ltd., “Notice Regarding the Occurrence of Unauthorized Access at a Subsidiary and the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure” (October 20, 2026) https://cocolonet.jp/uploads/20261020_news.pdf ; and “Apology and Notice Regarding the Occurrence of Unauthorized Access at a Subsidiary and the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure (Follow-up Report)” (November 11, 2026) https://cocolonet.jp/uploads/20261111_news01.pdf
- Kigetsudo Sereo Co., Ltd., “Apology and Notice Regarding the Occurrence of Unauthorized Access and the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure (Follow-up Report)” (November 11, 2026) https://kigetsudo-sougi.cocolonet.jp/news/%e4%b8%8d%e6%ad%a3%e3%82%a2%e3%82%af%e3%82%bb%e3%82%b9%e3%81%ae%e7%99%ba%e7%94%9f%e5%8f%8a%e3%81%b3%e5%80%8b%e4%ba%ba%e6%83%85%e5%a0%b1%e6%bc%8f%e3%81%88%e3%81%84%e3%81%ae%e5%8f%af%e8%83%bd%e6%80%a7/
- TBS NEWS DIG, “Unauthorized access occurring one after another across the country — possible outflow of about 10,000 items of personal information from flower-offering and gift orders on the website of the funeral company Tamanoya” (October 21, 2026) https://newsdig.tbs.co.jp/articles/-/3026731?display=1
- Nippon Jiji Shimbun, “Unauthorized access at two funeral companies under San Holdings — about 10,400 flower-offering orders at risk of exposure; card information not included” (November 3, 2026) https://jpjj.jp/articles/san-holdings-funeral-flower-site-unauthorized-access/
- For the meanings of terms, see the Security Laboratory glossary: Security Glossary — Personal Information (S-09), Exposure (S-46), Vulnerabilities and Zero-Days (S-17), Impersonation (S-28), Dark Web (S-22)
Entrance (other languages)