The Funeral Hall Reservation List Was Targeted — Unauthorized Access to Ashikaga City's Funeral Hall Reservation System, and How to Protect the Information of the Deceased and Chief Mourners

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.
This time, the story happened close to the funeral work where I spent many years. A “funeral hall reservation system,” a place where information about people who have died and their families gathers, was targeted from outside.
The result first
Here is the conclusion, up front.
- The funeral hall reservation system of Ashikaga City, Tochigi Prefecture, was accessed without authorization from outside. Busitec Co., Ltd., which provides the system, announced this on October 18, 2026
- Personal information for about 8,800 people (about 8,800 cases in the City of Ashikaga’s announcement) is expected to be among what may have been exposed. The scope of those affected was still under investigation at the time of the announcement
- A funeral hall reservation brings together not only the name of the deceased, but also the contact details of the applicant (in many cases, the chief mourner). Information that shows “who has died, who the family is, and where they live” is information with many materials for misuse
- That is why protection is needed on both sides — those who hold the information, and those who entrust it. Those who hold it should “narrow down the information they hold, keep checking, and decide in advance how to stop the system.” Those who entrust it should “verify whether a contact is genuine, using the publicly announced contact point”
- The route of intrusion has not been made public. This article writes only the facts confirmed in announcements and reporting, and does not jump to conclusions about the cause
What happened — what the announcements confirmed
On October 18, 2026, Busitec Co., Ltd. issued “Apology and Notice Regarding Unauthorized Access to the Funeral Hall Reservation System and the Possible Exposure of Personal Information.” Regarding the funeral hall reservation system the company provides to Ashikaga City, the announcement says the following.
- On October 15, 2026, unauthorized access from outside to the funeral hall reservation system provided to Ashikaga City was confirmed
- As a result of the investigation, unauthorized queries to the database and unauthorized addition of data to the system’s notice section were confirmed
- At present, it is expected that personal information for about 8,800 people may have been exposed. A detailed investigation is under way, including the types and scope of information involved
- To prevent the damage from spreading, the system in question has been stopped, and investigation of access records and confirmation of the system’s safety are under way. Resumption will be announced after safety has been sufficiently confirmed
An “unauthorized query to the database” means that someone without the right to view it queried the storehouse of information and looked inside. “Unauthorized addition of data to the notice section” means that an outsider added content without permission to the place where notices for users are displayed. Both sides happened — the side that was looked into, and the side that was written into.
What matters here is the wording of the announcement. “May have been exposed,” “is expected,” “investigation is under way.” It does not say that exposure has been confirmed. Whether there was exposure, and how far it reached, is a matter to wait for the results of the investigation.
What the City of Ashikaga’s announcement and reporting showed
Ashikaga City also made an announcement on October 18, and through a report to the city assembly on October 20 and other steps, news organizations conveyed the contents of the city’s announcement. The points that agree across reporting based on the city’s announcement are as follows.
- What may have been exposed is information registered from December 1, 2022 to October 15, 2026: the name, date of birth, address and gender of the deceased, and the name, address and telephone number of the applicant. The number of cases is about 8,800 (the Tokyo Shimbun reported 8,827 cases)
- The company name, address, telephone number and email address of the 56 funeral service providers registered in the system were also said to be among what may have been exposed
- The trigger for noticing something was wrong was a contact on October 15 from a funeral service provider saying “I cannot make a reservation.” The contractor company checked, and the unauthorized access came to light
- The city stopped the system and, from October 16, switched funeral hall reservation reception to telephone handling
- The city announced that no secondary damage has been confirmed
The same system is used by a total of 20 municipalities and partial affairs associations, including six cities in Tochigi Prefecture including Ashikaga City, as well as in Ibaraki, Saitama, Gunma and Niigata prefectures. According to reporting, the servers that store the information are separate for each municipality, and no damage has been confirmed outside Ashikaga City. However, to prevent the damage from spreading, all of the systems were temporarily stopped.
What followed — material to verify a genuine contact was published
Let me also follow the announcements that came after. For readers, this is where the practical value lies.
- On October 29, 2026, the company announced that it would begin sending individual apologies and notices, by post or telephone in sequence from around October 30, to those whose information may have been exposed
- On November 5, it announced that it would begin telephone contact in sequence for those for whom only name and telephone number may have been exposed. At this time, the telephone number to be used for the contact (0120-639-042) was made public
- In both announcements, caution was called for regarding suspicious contacts (telephone, email, postal mail) impersonating the company or funeral hall staff, and bills with no recollection. The telephone number for inquiries was also made public
In an incident where information may have gone outside, contacts may later arrive wearing the face of “for confirmation” or “notice of resumption,” in an act of impersonation. Making public in advance the number to be used for genuine contact provides material for telling the difference. I think this is a way of proceeding worth remembering.
Why a funeral hall reservation system is targeted — from the field
From here, this is my view as a former funeral director. This is not about the cause of this incident. The route of intrusion has not been made public, and no conclusion can be drawn. Rather, I will write, from the side that knows the field, about “what kind of information funeral hall reservation information is.”
Reservations for a funeral hall (crematorium) are generally made by a funeral company through a municipality’s contact point or system. What gathers with each reservation is information like this.
- The name of the person who died, and the date of death
- The date and time of the cremation or funeral (that is, “when that household is busy with the funeral”)
- The name, address and telephone number of the applicant — in many cases, the chief mourner
- The name and contact details of the funeral company in charge
What was named in the city’s announcement this time was information such as the names and addresses of the deceased and applicants, and information about funeral service providers. The funeral schedule itself was not announced as among what may have been exposed. Even so, as a property of the reservation arrangement itself, I think it is worth knowing that this is a place where “who has died, who the chief mourner is, where they live, and when the funeral will be held” gathers together in one place.
From the side that targets it, this information has many materials. The family is in the midst of grief, and it is a time when judgment does not work as usual. Contacts disguised as procedures or inheritance can look plausible. If the day of the funeral is known, the day the house will be empty can also be seen. Behind the word “may have been” used in incident after incident is this abundance of materials.
About the fear that lies beyond this abundance of materials, this is how I put it:
The frightening thing about unauthorized access is that stolen information is bought and sold on dark websites and the like. I think it is that, in places you know nothing about, accounts are opened and certificates are created, and another version of yourself comes to exist.
About how the stealing side calculates it, too, this is how I put it:
There is no way the person who stole it would brazenly come out into the open. Even if they sell one person’s information for just a few hundred yen, when it is the information of tens of thousands of people, a large amount of money ends up in their pocket. And once they get a taste for it, they will keep repeating the same thing to keep earning.
About how well stolen information sells, too, this is how I put it:
Personal information sells even when it is duplicated.
To close, this is how I put it:
It means that name lists sell — now, just as they always have.
Let me write one more thing, as a sense from the field. Tools used every day only in that industry, like a funeral hall reservation system, tend to be treated as “the usual tools of the job.” For both those who use them and those who make them, keeping the set work turning becomes the center, and checking and updating can fall out of view. This is not about the actual circumstances of Ashikaga City or the company. It is a habit in how tools are dealt with that can happen in any field. The course of events this time — that what noticed the abnormality was a contact from the field saying “I cannot make a reservation” — becomes material for thinking about that habit.
How to protect places where information about the deceased and chief mourners gathers
Finally, I will write the lessons for the protecting side, divided into those who hold the information and those who entrust it.
For those who hold it (municipalities, operators, funeral companies)
- Narrow down the information held, and do not keep old information forever: Do not gather beyond the scope needed for the work. Do not keep records whose role has ended in the same place forever. This time, the fact that those affected were shown divided as “registrations from December 1, 2022 onward” means that the length of the period accumulated becomes, as it is, the scope of the impact
- Put checking and updating into “the usual work”: A tool does not end when it is introduced. Keep turning, as set work, the updating of the foundation and checking for signs of having been looked into. I have written a separate article about how this checking is done: You Can Find the ‘Weak Spots’ Yourself, Before Someone Breaks In — The Basics of Vulnerability Assessment and How to Protect a Small Site
- Make the key for entry stronger: At the entrance for those who manage the system, put arrangements that layer keys, such as two-step verification. The smaller the system, the more this tends to be put off
- Decide in advance how to stop it, and how to make contact: When something is noticed to be wrong, who makes the decision to stop it? How will users be informed? How will the number or contact point used for genuine contact be made public? Thinking about it after it happens will be late, so decide in advance
- When something seems wrong, stop it first: In this case, the system was stopped on the same day the unauthorized access was confirmed, and from the next day reservation reception was switched to telephone. Even if the work becomes inconvenient, stop it first. That speed of judgment is the basis for keeping damage from spreading
For those who entrust it (users and families)
- Compare with the publicly announced number and verify: In this case, the telephone number the company uses for contact has been made public. For a “notice” from any other number, do not believe it on the spot — call back yourself to the publicly announced inquiry contact point and verify
- Be most suspicious of “notice of resumption” and “request for confirmation”: A plausible contact that arrives after an incident is the most dangerous kind. Do not proceed with procedures based only on guidance by email or postal mail — verify at the official contact point
- Do not respond to bills you do not recognize: It is precisely when you are worried that talk of bills and procedures comes up. For anything you do not recognize, do not answer on the spot — report it to the contact point
Where the line is — what is not yet known
The bigger the stir, the more the line matters. As of this article, I will honestly list what is not yet known.
- The route of intrusion has not been made public: Where entry was made from is not written anywhere in the announcements. No conclusion about the cause will be drawn
- Whether exposure occurred, and its scope, are under investigation: This is at the “may have been” stage, and is not a confirmed matter
- The timing for resuming the system is undecided: The announcement says it will be announced “after safety has been sufficiently confirmed”
- This article is based on announcements and reporting that could be read as of November 21, 2026. If new announcements come out, the contents will change
Information about a person who has died is not only that person’s own. It is also information about the lives of the family left behind. How do we protect the information that gathers behind the procedures of farewell? I think this incident quietly placed that question before both the funeral field and those who hold systems in trust.
Sources
- Busitec Co., Ltd., “Apology and Notice Regarding Unauthorized Access to the Funeral Hall Reservation System and the Possible Exposure of Personal Information” (October 18, 2026) https://www.busitec.co.jp/news/info
- Busitec Co., Ltd., “Apology and Notice to Those Whose Information May Have Been Exposed” (October 29, 2026) https://www.busitec.co.jp/news/20261029
- Busitec Co., Ltd., “Start of Telephone Contact in the Apology and Notice to Those Whose Information May Have Been Exposed” (November 5, 2026) https://www.busitec.co.jp/news/20261105
- Reporting based on the City of Ashikaga announcement: Asahi Shimbun, “Funeral hall reservation system stopped after cyberattack, possible exposure of information including that of the deceased” (October 18, 2026); Mainichi Shimbun, “Unauthorized access to funeral hall” (October 20, 2026); Tokyo Shimbun, “Ashikaga: Possible exposure of 8,827 cases and other funeral hall reservation information” (October 21, 2026)
- Cybersecurity-jp, “Unauthorized access to Ashikaga City’s funeral hall reservation system, possible exposure of personal information for about 8,800 people” (October 21, 2026) https://cybersecurity-jp.com/news/117564
- For the meanings of terms, see the Security Laboratory glossary: Security Glossary — Personal Information (S-09), Exposure (S-46), Impersonation (S-28)
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