Devices & Accounts

A Small Town's Hospital Stopped for Two Months — Ransomware at Tsurugi Town Handa Hospital (2021)

Security Lab — kurashiki-bouzu

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.

This time, I am looking back at an incident from a little while ago. What was targeted was the only public hospital in a town of about 8,000 people. When a town hospital’s system stops, medical care itself goes back to paper.

The result first

The conclusion, up front:

What happened — in the early hours, the printers began moving all at once

At around 0:30 a.m. on October 31, 2021, a problem with the electronic medical records was confirmed. In the early hours, several printers inside the hospital began printing, all at once, a document stating that data had been encrypted. At 3:00 a.m., a systems staff member who had rushed in disconnected the network for the electronic medical records, and at 8:00 a.m. infection with ransomware was confirmed. That day, the hospital was on regional emergency duty, but at around 9:00 a.m. it informed the relevant parties that it could not accept emergency patients.

At 10:00 a.m., a disaster response headquarters was formally established. A plan prepared for disasters such as earthquakes was applied, just as it was, to a cyberattack. Care would continue on paper. The use of CT and MRI was stopped, out of concern that a virus might be mixed in. In the afternoon, infection was also found on accounting terminals, and outpatient accounting became impossible. And at 4:00 p.m., on the very day the incident came to light, the hospital held a press conference.

To put it in terms of a house: the hospital’s ledgers, its appointment books and its accounting books were all put together into a locked box. The box would not open. But the patients in front of them could not wait. The hospital made blank notebooks into new ledgers, and continued with the care in front of them.

Two months continued on paper

The basic policy the hospital decided first had four points. To protect the inpatients who were already there. To limit outpatients, in principle, to those with appointments. To work to restore the electronic medical records. And for everyone to help one another and get through it. They are plain words, but whether “what to protect” has been decided on the day things stop makes a large difference to what happens afterwards.

The report counts 40 terminals and servers affected in total. Among them were the main server for the electronic medical records, and the backup server where copies were kept. The copies, kept while still connected, were encrypted together with the main system. On the other hand, older copies kept in a place separated from the network were safe, and could be used for recovery.

Rebuilding overlapped with the work of the company contracted for investigation and recovery, and with the preparation of a temporary system for the electronic medical records. On January 4, 2022, the electronic medical records began working again, and normal care resumed. It had been about two months since the incident came to light.

The entry point was one device that had not been updated

What I want to write honestly is the story of the entry point.

The report states that it is “extremely likely” that a weakness in a VPN device for remote maintenance was exploited to get in. That device still had weaknesses that had been pointed out repeatedly since 2019. The device’s software had never been updated, not once, since it was installed. Furthermore, IDs and passwords for about 87,000 devices worldwide, collected by exploiting that weakness, had become public in September 2021, and the investigation confirmed that this hospital’s were included among them. The password had not been changed, and there was no setting to restrict who could connect, and no second method of confirmation.

However, the report itself also writes that the entry point could not be proved. After the incident, the device’s software was updated without records being preserved, so the material for tracing it afterwards disappeared. “It must have come in from here” and “it was proved to have come in from here” are different things. This report honestly leaves that boundary in place.

The report is also frank about how easily the intrusion could spread once inside. Passwords inside the hospital were as short as five characters, with a setting that did not stop access no matter how many times a mistake was made. The antivirus software for the electronic medical records was not running, for the reason of a problem when it was installed, and updates to the basic software had also been stopped. The report’s view is that, under the assumption that “because the system is closed, it is safe,” the protective settings had been lowered one by one. And the hospital’s systems staff was, in effect, one person.

For people running a small company — a list of entrances, and procedures on paper

This hospital was not a large organisation. It was a town hospital, with one person in charge. That closely resembles the shape of many small and medium-sized companies. That is precisely why this incident becomes, just as it is, a checklist.

To close

The heart of Handa Hospital’s two months is not the surprise that “a hospital in the countryside was targeted.” It is the record of one device that was not updated, a password that was not changed, and the people who nevertheless continued care on paper.

And this hospital continued to publish, in detail, what had happened. The hospital’s explanation is that this was so that other hospitals and workplaces would not suffer the same thing. Not hiding things reduces the next harm. Including that stance, I believe the record of this incident is worth preserving.

Sources: Tsurugi Town Handa Hospital, “Report of the Expert Panel on the Computer Virus Infection Incident” (June 7, 2022). The hospital’s official explanation page, “On the Report of the Expert Panel on the Computer Virus Infection Incident” (June 7, 2022).


Entrance (other languages)

日本語 中文 Español 한국어 Français Deutsch

Devices & Accounts / Back to the English top