A Hospital's Work Stopped — The Ransomware Infection at Utsunomiya Central Clinic, and How to Prepare for the Day the Work Stops

Hello, I am Kurashiki Bouzu (kurashiki-bouzu), born in 1971. I am a former funeral director, and I now live in an old house in Kurashiki, Okayama, working together with my AI butler, Moka.
This time, the story is about a hospital’s information. However, both the entry point and the fear are a little different from what has come before. In addition to the fear that information may have gone outside, this was a case where the fear that “the day’s work itself stops” came out clearly.
The result first
Let me write the conclusion first.
- At DIC Utsunomiya Central Clinic in Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture, a system failure occurred on February 10, 2025, and it was found that data on a server had been encrypted by ransomware. The clinic announced this on February 18, 2025
- The server held personal information for up to about 300,000 people in total, including patients, people who had received health checkups, and people connected with the clinic. Whether there had been a leak was still under investigation at the time of the announcement
- As a result of disconnecting the server to keep the damage from spreading, the internal systems remained unusable, and medical examinations and health checkups were limited. All normal medical examination and health checkup services resumed on May 14, 2025. That is about three months after the failure
- The fear in this case is twofold. There is the fear that information may have gone outside, and the fear that “the day’s work” — medical examinations and health checkups — stops
- How to protect against this is not a story for hospitals alone. The same applies to small workplaces where reservations and reception work run on a system, and the keys are “keeping copies separately” and “a paper procedure for the day everything stops”
- The route of intrusion has not been made public. In this article, I write only the facts confirmed by the announcement and reporting, and I do not jump to conclusions about the cause
What happened — what was confirmed in the announcement
On February 18, 2025, the clinic issued “Regarding the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure Due to Unauthorized Access and the Restriction of Services for the Time Being.” The following points can be confirmed from the text of the announcement.
- On February 10, 2025, a system failure occurred inside the clinic, and the systems became unusable. Upon investigation, it was found that a server had been attacked with ransomware and data had been encrypted
- After that, measures were taken to disconnect the server from the internet and the clinic’s internal network, so the internal systems have remained unusable
- Before that, in a notice dated February 12, the clinic had already announced restrictions on medical examination and health checkup services
- At the time of the announcement, no misuse of information or similar problem had been confirmed
Ransomware is a tool that encrypts the other party’s data so it cannot be read, and demands, “If you want it restored, pay money.” Its characteristic feature is that it not only steals data, but also locks out its owner. In this case, that “lockout” happened right in the middle of a hospital’s work.
The information recorded on the server
In the announcement, the information recorded on the server in question is shown, down to a breakdown.
- The number of cases is up to about 300,000 people
- Information about customers: name, date of birth, gender, address, telephone number, email address, information relating to medical care, information relating to health checkups, and so on
- Information about people connected with the clinic (doctors, nurses, and employees): name, date of birth, gender, address, telephone number, and so on
- Financial institution account information, credit card information, and My Number information are not included
The point that information relating to medical care and health checkups is included gives this a weight particular to a hospital. Even here, however, the wording of the announcement matters. What the clinic is saying is at the stage of “there is a possibility that it leaked,” and it is not written that a leak has been confirmed. The clinic also announced that it had asked a specialist external investigation organization for cooperation and would proceed to clarify the cause and the full picture, and that it was reporting to and consulting with the Personal Information Protection Commission, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the police. A sentence is also included saying, “If new facts that should be made public are confirmed in the future, we will inform you again.”
As of November 2026, when I am writing this article, no follow-up report from the clinic publishing the conclusion of the investigation about whether there was a leak or about the cause of the intrusion has appeared, as far as I have been able to confirm. What is not known is listed honestly in the final “line-drawing” section.
About three months until the work returned
In this case, another thing worth looking at is the time it took.
In its announcement, the clinic said, “For the time being, we will limit medical examination and health checkup services,” and said that the services it could handle would be announced in sequence on its website. And in materials from the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, it is recorded that the clinic “resumed all normal medical examination and health checkup services” on May 14, 2025. On the clinic’s site as well, a notice dated May 14 says that applications for health checkups and comprehensive medical examinations have begun.
From February 10, when the failure occurred, to May 14, when normal services returned, is about three months. During that time, it means that medical examinations and health checkups had to keep being carried out in a limited form.
A hospital’s work is a collection of work that cannot be put off until tomorrow. Seeing the patients who came that day. Carrying out the health checkups reserved for that day. When a system stops, it means that this “day’s work” stops just as it is. It was an incident about information, and at the same time, an incident about work. I think that point is this case’s most distinctive feature.
This case’s place among stories about hospital information
Stories in which a hospital’s information is put at risk have different types, depending on the entry point.
- The type entered from outside: A story in which, through unauthorized access from outside, a fear arises that information about patients and staff was viewed. The center of the fear is “information”
- The type involving a tool that carries information out: A story in which a tool such as a USB memory stick containing information is lost after being taken out. Rather than being entered, it is a form of leaving something behind
- The type that is locked out: This case. Data is encrypted and the owner themselves can no longer use it, and on top of the fear about information, the fear that “the work itself stops” is added
Even within the same “stories about hospital information,” if the entry point differs, the way to prepare also differs. This case is best read as that third type.
How to prepare for the day everything stops
Finally, I will write the lessons for the side that protects. This is a story about a large hospital, but if you read it in another way, it applies just as it is to small workplaces where reservations, reception, and accounting run on a system — clinics, dental offices, pharmacies, shops, and even the reception desk of a funeral home.
For the side that is entrusted with information (workplaces and businesses)
- Keep copies separately: Do not place copies of important data (backups) in the same place, or within the same connections, as the system you always use. A copy placed on the same network may be encrypted together with the main body. A copy placed in a location disconnected from the network becomes the final place to restore from. In addition, “having a copy” and “being able to restore” are not the same, so it is also necessary to test whether you can actually restore from it
- Prepare a paper procedure for the day everything stops: Even on a day when the system cannot be used, reception, reservations, and contact work must keep going. Keep the day’s reservation list, contact details, and copies of slips in a form that can be handled on paper. When recovery takes months, as in this case, that procedure keeps the work connected, thinly and for a long time
- Think on the premise that recovery will take a long time: This case took about three months. If you build your procedure on the estimate that “it will return in a few days,” the work will stop when that premise collapses. On the premise that it will take a long time, decide in advance who to inform, of what, and in what order
- When you notice something is wrong, disconnect first: In this case, after the attack was confirmed, the server was disconnected from the internet and the clinic’s internal network. Because of that, the internal systems became unusable, but it is a basic move to keep the damage from spreading. It is a judgment that stops the spread of damage in exchange for inconvenience
For the side that entrusts information (patients and people who received examinations)
- Be careful of contacts pretending to be “from the hospital”: In its announcement, the clinic also calls for caution about suspicious emails and scam-like telephone calls that could be mistaken as coming from the clinic. For a “request for confirmation” that arrives after an incident, all the more, do not respond on the spot; contact a publicly announced point of contact yourself to check
- Check the point of contact using the publicly announced number: In this case, the telephone number for the inquiry desk (028-657-8201) was made public in the announcement. If you are unsure about whether a contact is genuine, call back not the number in the contact that reached you, but the publicly announced number
Drawing the line — what is not known
The bigger the uproar over a story, the more important it is to draw the line. As of this article, I will honestly list what is not known.
- The route of intrusion has not been made public: Nowhere in the clinic’s announcement is it written where the intrusion came from. Some explanations have written speculation about the route, but because that is not the clinic’s own publication, this article does not jump to conclusions about the cause
- Whether there was a leak has not been confirmed: The stage at the time of the announcement is “the possibility of a leak.” A follow-up report from the clinic publishing the conclusion of the investigation has not appeared, as of this article, as far as I have been able to confirm
- About the attackers’ claim: Some security media reported that a ransomware group claimed, on the dark web, that it had stolen information. However, this is a claim by the attackers’ side, and the clinic has not confirmed it. The clinic’s official announcement remains, as written above, at “the possibility of a leak.” I note it here as a point where it is necessary to read claims and facts separately
- This article is based on the announcements and reporting that could be read as of November 21, 2026. If a new announcement comes out, the content will change
The fear that information may have leaked is a fear that is hard to see. But the fear that medical examinations stop appears in a visible form for the people who went to the hospital that day. A system is a “tool for work,” and at the same time, it has become a place where, if it stops, the work itself stops. I think this case was a story that showed that obvious fact through the length of time of about three months.
Sources
- DIC Utsunomiya Central Clinic, “Regarding the Possibility of Personal Information Exposure Due to Unauthorized Access and the Restriction of Services for the Time Being” (February 18, 2025) https://ucc.or.jp/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/download_file.php_.pdf
- DIC Utsunomiya Central Clinic, “Applications for This Year’s Health Checkups and Comprehensive Medical Examinations” (May 14, 2025) https://ucc.or.jp/2025/05/17493
- National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, “The Situation Surrounding Cybersecurity (FY2024 Q4) — Lessons Learned from Recent Incidents” (June 2, 2025) https://www.cyber.go.jp/pdf/council/cs/ciip/dai39/39shiryou_04.pdf
- NTV NEWS NNN, “Cyberattack on a Clinic in Utsunomiya City, Personal Information of Up to About 300,000 People May Have Leaked” (February 18, 2025) https://news.ntv.co.jp/category/society/60bc4a2a1a864e5c8ec3168ee0dbf9ff
- Cybersecurity.com, “A Difficult Situation for Business Operations Due to Ransomware, Concerns About a Leak Affecting 300,000 People — DIC Utsunomiya Central Clinic” (February 20, 2025) https://cybersecurity-jp.com/news/109019
- The meanings of words can be looked up in the Security Lab glossary: Security Glossary — Ransomware (S-45), Backup (S-35), Personal Information (S-09), Leak (S-46)
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